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I. INTRODUCTION
Like many states in this nation, the State of Florida has enacted a
comprehensive set of workers’ compensation laws “to assure the
quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an
injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to gainful employment at a reasonable cost to the employer.”1 Florida’s workers’
compensation system “is based on a mutual renunciation of commonlaw rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.”2 A critical aspect of this mutual renunciation of rights is the concept of
* Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Susan C. Bucklew, United States District Court,
Middle District of Florida. B.S., University of South Carolina, 1996; J.D., Florida State
University, 1999.
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000).
2. Id.
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workers’ compensation exclusivity or workers’ compensation immunity.3 In simple terms, Florida’s workers’ compensation exclusivity
statute provides tort immunity to an employer when an employee is
injured within the course of his or her employment, so long as the
employer has a valid workers’ compensation policy in place.4 The Supreme Court of Florida in Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc.5 has
explained the rationale:
[T]he concept of exclusiveness of remedy embodied in Fla.Stat.
§ 440.11, F.S.A. appears to be a rational mechanism for making
the compensation system work in accord with the purposes of the
Act. In return for accepting vicarious liability for all work-related
injuries regardless of fault, and surrendering his traditional defenses and superior resources for litigation, the employer is allowed to treat compensation as a routine cost of doing business
which can be budgeted for without fear of any substantial adverse
tort judgments. Similarly, the employee trades his tort remedies
for a system of compensation without contest, thus sparing him
the cost, delay, and uncertainty of a claim in litigation.6

Although workers’ compensation immunity protects an employer
from most work-related tort lawsuits, the exclusivity provision of section 440.11, Florida Statutes, does not insulate an employer from intentional tort lawsuits brought by employees.7 In other words, “employers are provided with immunity from suit by their employees so
long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed
to result in or that is substantially certain to result in injury or death
to the employee.”8 While the Florida Legislature has not statutorily
mandated an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of
section 440.11, the Florida Supreme Court has held that such an exception is logically part of Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme.9
Given this fact, courts in Florida have been largely, if not exclusively,
responsible for defining the parameters of the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity.10 In forming this judicially
created exception, courts in Florida have been less than sure as to
what actually constitutes an intentional tort.11 In fact, the Supreme
Court of Florida has recently reversed some of its own rulings that
define the scope of the intentional tort exception to workers’ compen3. See id. § 440.11.
4. See John T. Burnett & Kyle L. Redfearn, Workers’ Compensation Immunity and
Intentional Torts: How To Be “Substantially Certain” in Defending Your Case, TRIAL
ADVOC. Q., Spring, 1999, at 15, 15.
5. 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972).
6. Id. at 365.
7. See Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1993).
8. Id.
9. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 2000).
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.B.
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sation immunity.12 At the heart of the confusion over what constitutes an intentional tort under Florida workers’ compensation law is
the phrase “substantially certain to result in injury or death” as used
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Fisher v. Shenandoah General
Construction Co.13 and Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Products, Inc.14
In those cases, the supreme court implied that an employer is provided immunity from suit by his or her employees so long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in, or
that is substantially certain to result in, injury or death to the employee.15 Subsequent to those opinions, Florida courts have embraced
various views as to what “substantially certain to result in injury or
death to the employee” actually means.16 Even with the Florida Supreme Court’s recent attempt in Turner v. PCR, Inc. to clarify what
“substantially certain” means in the context of workers’ compensation immunity, the exact definition of the term still remains vague.17
Due to this confusion as to what constitutes an intentional tort under
Florida’s workers’ compensation law, this Article suggests that the
Florida Legislature enact a statutory intentional tort exception to the
exclusivity provisions found in section 440.11, Florida Statutes.
Part II of this Article explores the policies behind workers’ compensation immunity and the rise of the intentional tort exception.
Part III discusses the statutory and common law development of exceptions to workers’ compensation immunity in Florida and examines
the changes in the court-created “substantial certainty” standard.
Part IV deals with recent court opinions that have attempted to clarify what constitutes an intentional tort and specifically examines the
Florida Supreme Court’s recent holding in Turner v. PCR, Inc. Part
IV also addresses the continued uncertainty as to what “substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee” means. Finally, Part V argues for a statutorily defined intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions found in section 440.11, Florida
Statutes. Part V also proposes a definition that could be used in a
statutory intentional tort exception and shows how that proposed
definition is workable in the context of past Florida cases.

12. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687.
13. 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
14. 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; see
also Burnett & Redfearn, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that the term “substantially certain”
is often misconstrued in the workers’ compensation arena).
15. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 880.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.B.
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II. THE POLICIES BEHIND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IMMUNITY AND
THE RISE OF AN INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION
A. Policies Behind Workers’ Compensation Immunity
As noted above, the workers’ compensation system in Florida is
based in part on a renunciation of common law rights and defenses
by employers. In exchange for those common law rights and defenses,
“the employer is allowed to treat compensation as a routine cost of
doing business which can be budgeted for without fear of any substantial adverse tort judgments.”18 A logical concomitant to this exchange of rights is the concept of an exclusive remedy for injured
employees.19 In other words, before an employer can be asked to accept virtual strict liability as to workplace injuries, the employer
must first be afforded some sort of immunity from tort actions based
on such injuries. Acknowledging this reality, the Florida Legislature
has mandated that, as a general rule, workers’ compensation is an
injured worker’s exclusive remedy for qualifying workplace injuries.20
Specifically, section 440.11, Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part
that, “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in [the workers’ compensation statute] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the employee . . . on account of [a covered] injury or death . . . .”21
In addition to protecting an employer from tort lawsuits based on
certain workplace injuries, the exclusivity of workers’ compensation
also extends to coemployees and supervisory employees in certain
circumstances.22 Much like employers, coemployees of an injured
worker are generally protected from tort lawsuits based on qualifying
workplace injuries unless they act with “willful and wanton disregard or unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence
when such acts result in injury or death.”23 Supervisory or
managerial employees are provided similar immunity as long as they
do not act in a manner that would constitute a violation of the law
punishable by a term of sixty days of imprisonment as set forth in
section 775.082, Florida Statutes.24
Although the immunity provided to coemployees and managerial/supervisory employees is limited on the face of the exclusivity
statute itself, there is no similar limitation of employer liability

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Mullarkey v. Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 1972).
See FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (2000).
See id.
Id. § 440.11(1).
See id.
Id.
See id.
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found in the statute.25 In other words, while employee immunity is
limited by the standards of gross negligence and culpable negligence,
an employer’s workers’ compensation immunity is not specifically
limited on the face of section 440.11. Therefore, it would appear that
the plain language of the workers’ compensation immunity statute
would shield an employer from tort liability even if the employer had
engaged in conduct that was intentionally designed to injure its employees. In 1986, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal certified
the following question to the Florida Supreme Court in two companion cases: “Does the Florida workers’ compensation law preclude actions by employees against their corporate employers for intentional
torts even though the injuries were incurred within the scope of their
employment?”26
In both of the cases in which this question was certified, the supreme court refused to provide an answer to the question as asked.27
Rather, the supreme court restated the certified question and determined that as a matter of law, the conduct at issue in the certified
cases did not constitute an intentional tort.28 In other words, the supreme court found that there was no need to determine whether an
intentional tort falls within the scope of workers’ compensation immunity because the conduct at issue in the two certified cases did not
rise to the level of an intentional tort.29 Although the supreme court
did not answer the fundamental question underlying the two certified cases, it did provide a rough definition as to what constitutes an
intentional tort under Florida workers’ compensation law. In fact,
the two opinions in Lawton and Fisher gave birth to the “substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee” standard
that is the subject of this Article.
B. The Rise of an Intentional Tort Exception to Workers’
Compensation Immunity
In Fisher the court recognized that an intentional tort is usually
based on a deliberate intent to injure another.30 However, in most
employment situations, “one can safely assume that employers will
not engage in conduct that is designed to intentionally injure an em25. See id. This observation goes only to the conduct limitations (i.e., gross negligence
and culpable negligence) found in the exclusivity statute and not to other immunity limitations based on nonconduct factors such as the existence of a valid workers’ compensation
policy.
26. Fisher v. Shenandoah General Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 882 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc.,
498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
27. See cases cited supra note 26.
28. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 881.
29. See Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 881.
30. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883.
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ployee.”31 Nonetheless, while most employers do not intentionally try
to hurt their employees, some employers engage in conduct that is so
dangerous that an intent to injure can be inferred from their conduct.32 In light of this fact, the court in Fisher turned to the precepts
of traditional tort law as stated in the matter of Spivey v. Battaglia33
to define an intentional tort.34 In Spivey, the Florida Supreme Court
decided whether an unsolicited hug given to a plaintiff constituted a
battery when the person who gave the hug did not have any actual
intent to injure the plaintiff but injured her nonetheless.35 Holding
that the hug in question did not constitute a battery, the court in
Spivey stated that “[w]here a reasonable man would believe that a
particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be held
in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it.”36 Adopting the
logic behind the court’s decision in Spivey, the court in Fisher further
defined the concept of “substantial certainty” using the words of Professor Prosser:
“[T]he mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—something
short of substantial certainty—is not intent. The defendant who
acts in the belief or consciousness that the act is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is
great the conduct may be characterized as reckless and wanton,
but is not an intentional wrong.”37

In Lawton the supreme court reiterated the language cited above
from Spivey and Professor Prosser by citing to its decision in Fisher.38
However, the court in Lawton stated that the “substantially certain”
standard expressed in Fisher “requires more than a strong probability of injury. It requires virtual certainty.”39 Thus, while the court in
Lawton and Fisher did not determine whether suits for intentional
torts are barred by employers’ workers’ compensation immunity, the
court did give a rough definition as to what constitutes an intentional
tort under workers’ compensation law, and it gave two factual examples of what is not intentional behavior on the part of an employer.
Despite the supreme court’s reluctance to decide the issue of
whether workers’ compensation immunity barred suits for inten31. Burnett & Redfearn, supra note 4, at 15.
32. See id. at 16.
33. 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972).
34. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883 (citing Spivey).
35. See Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 817.
36. Id.
37. Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 36 (5th ed.
1984)).
38. See Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in
part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
39. Id. The court in Fisher also spoke generally in terms of virtual certainty, see
Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884, but the court in Lawton announced this requirement in more express terms.
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tional injury, Justice James C. Adkins, in his dissent in Fisher, argued that when read in conjunction with the rest of the workers’
compensation statute, section 440.11 clearly does not provide immunity for employers against intentional-injury tort lawsuits.40 Noting
that sections 440.09(1) and 440.02(14) limit compensation to accidents arising out of and in the course of employment, Justice Adkins
contended that an intentional tort can never be accidental and thus
can never be within the purview of the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.41 Additionally, Justice Adkins noted that with the
exception of Delaware, no state in the nation prohibits an employee
from bringing an intentional tort action due to a workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.42 Notwithstanding Justice Adkins’ dissent
on the issue, however, the question of whether Florida’s exclusivity
statute bars intentional tort claims was officially left open until 1994,
when the supreme court issued its opinion in Eller v. Shova.43
In Eller, the supreme court relied on its prior holdings in Lawton
and Fisher and stated that there is an intentional tort exception to
workers’ compensation immunity in Florida.44 In doing so, the court
adopted the “substantially certain” language that was used in Fisher
and Lawton as part of what constitutes an excluded intentional
tort.45 Subsequent to the court’s opinion in Eller, the Florida district
courts of appeal have never seriously questioned the propriety of the
supreme court’s proclamation of an intentional tort exception to
workers’ compensation immunity.46 In fact, the Supreme Court of
Florida still relies on its opinion in Eller to support its intentional
tort exception.47 As noted above, however, such an exception has
never been codified by the Florida Legislature in the workers’ compensation statutes.48
40. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 885 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1994).
44. Eller, 630 So. 2d at 539. The court’s reliance on Lawton and Fisher as support for
an intentional tort exception is curious due to the fact that the court in Lawton and Fisher
specifically refused to address the intentional tort exception issue.
45. See id.
46. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 2000). However, in an opinion
prior to Eller, Judge Michael E. Allen noted, in concurrence, that reliance on Fisher and
Lawton for support of an intentional tort exception was misplaced. See Timones v. Excel
Indus., 631 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (Allen, J., concurring).
47. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 686.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 440.01-.60 (2000). It is interesting to note that in the past, the
Florida Legislature has amended the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision in response to the supreme court’s interpretation of immunity under section 440.11. See Eller,
630 So. 2d at 540 (discussing the so-called Streeter Amendment of 1988, which “provide[d]
for heightened immunity to policymaking types of employees by raising the degree of negligence necessary to maintain a civil tort action against such employees from gross negligence to culpable negligence when those employees are engaged in managerial or policymaking decisions”). In light of this fact, one could argue that through its silence, the legis-
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III. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
IMMUNITY EXCEPTIONS
As seen above, workers’ compensation immunity in Florida is not
without its limits. Since the passage of workers’ compensation legislation in Florida, statutory and common law exceptions have been
created to temper the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy. To better understand the development of the common law intentional tort exception for employers, one must first look to the statutory exceptions to immunity that have been mandated by the Florida
Legislature.
A. Statutory Exceptions to Workers’ Compensation Immunity
To appreciate the statutory exceptions to workers’ compensation
immunity in Florida, one must begin with a fictional baseline proposition that employers and their employees are completely immune
from all tort suits arising from workplace injuries that qualify for
workers’ compensation payments under the law. With this fictional
base in mind, the first statutory exception to workers’ compensation
immunity relates to employees who are injured by their coworkers.
As noted above, coemployees of an injured worker are generally protected from tort lawsuits based on qualifying workplace injuries
unless they act with “willful and wanton disregard or unprovoked
physical aggression or with gross negligence when such acts result in
injury or death.”49 As a general matter, courts in Florida have had little trouble in applying the coemployee immunity exception and have
defined the statute’s reference to gross negligence as “an act or omission that a reasonable, prudent person would know is likely to result
in injury to another.”50
The second statutory exception to workers’ compensation immunity relates to managerial and supervisory employees. Supervisory or
managerial employees are provided tort immunity as long as they do
not act in a manner that would constitute a violation of the law punishable by a term of sixty days or more of imprisonment as set forth

lature has approved the supreme court’s creation of an intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity in Florida. Assuming the merits of such an argument, this Article asserts that a legislatively defined intentional tort exception is needed to provide clarity as to the scope of that exception under the law.
49. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2000).
50. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687 n.3 (quoting Eller, 630 So. 2d at 541 n.3);. Prior to the
1988 amendment to section 440.11, courts typically defined gross negligence as follows: (1)
a composite of circumstances that constitute imminent or clear and present danger
amounting to more than normal and usual peril; (2) predicated on a showing of chargeable
knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger; and (3) a conscious disregard of consequences. See, e.g., Kline v. Rubio, 652 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Foreman v.
Russo, 624 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
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in section 775.082, Florida Statutes.51 This immunity is often referred
to as the “culpable negligence” exception to workers’ compensation
immunity.52 To hold a supervisory employee liable in tort for compensable workplace injuries, an employee must prove that the supervisor, through culpable negligence, actively inflicted injury on the
employee.53 Florida case law has defined culpable negligence as being
“of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard
for the safety of others. It is that entire want of care which raises a
presumption of indifference to consequences.”54
Given the explanations of the two statutory exceptions discussed
above, it can be argued that a reader of the plain language of section
440.11, Florida Statutes, would be left with the following assumptions:
(1) an employer who has a valid workers’ compensation policy in
place is immune from all tort suits brought by employees who are
injured in the course and scope of their employment; and
(2) a supervisory or managerial employee of such an employer is
immune from tort suits brought by employees who are injured in
the course and scope of their employment so long as the managerial or supervisory employee does not actively inflict injury on the
employee in question through negligence of a gross and flagrant
character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others and which raises a presumption of indifference to consequences; and
(3) a coemployee is immune from tort lawsuits based on injuries
sustained by other employees who are injured in the course and
scope of their employment so long as the coemployee does not act
with willful and wanton disregard, unprovoked physical aggression, or with gross negligence that a reasonable, prudent person
would know is likely to result in injury to another.

Although the second and third assumptions noted above are correct
under Florida law, the assumption that an employer is immune from
all tort suits brought by employees who are injured in the course and
scope of their employment is not. This is so because of the supreme
court’s intentional tort exception to employer immunity.

51. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2000). This immunity also applies to “any sole proprietor, partner, corporate officer or director, . . . or other person who in the scope of his or her
employment duties acts in a managerial or policymaking capacity.” Id.
52. See e.g., Kennedy v. Moree, 650 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Emergency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
53. See Kennedy, 650 So. 2d at 1107.
54. Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), quoted in Kennedy, 650 So.
2d at 1107.
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B. The Intentional Tort Exception to Employer Immunity
With the birth of the intentional tort exception to employer immunity explored above, the development of the definition of that exception in Florida court opinions must now be examined.
1. The Definitive Cases
As noted above, the two cases that initially attempted to define
the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity are
Fisher and Lawton. Also noted above, the supreme court in Fisher
and Lawton defined an intentional tort as any intentional act designed to result in, or that is “substantially certain to result in injury
or death” to the employee.55 Despite the use of the term “substantially certain” in Fisher and Lawton, however, the supreme court
spoke in terms of “virtual certainty” in both of those opinions.56 Thus,
after the opinions in Fisher and Lawton, the definition of an intentional tort, as that term relates to workers’ compensation immunity,
could be understood as any intentional act designed to result in, or
that is substantially certain (meaning virtually certain) to result in,
injury or death to the employee. Standing alone, this definition of an
intentional tort does little to explain what “substantially certain” or
“virtually certain” actually mean. To be sure, after Fisher and
Lawton, all that was known was that “substantial” or “virtual” certainty means more than a “strong probability of injury,” greater than
“gross[ly] negligen[t]” conduct, and greater than “reckless and wanton” conduct.57 More instructive than the actual definitions provided
by the court in Fisher and Lawton, however, are the facts of the
Fisher case, in light of the court’s holding that no intentional tort was
committed in that matter.
In Fisher, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendantemployer required its employees to enter pipes that contained poisonous gases in order to clean the pipes with high pressure hoses.58
The plaintiff further alleged that the employer failed to provide its
employees with oxygen masks, gas detection equipment, rescue
equipment, and other safety equipment required under federal law.59
Additionally, the complaint in Fisher alleged that the employer
forced its employees to deliberately evade safety inspections so as to
prevent the company from being cited for safety violations.60 As a re55. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986), overruled
in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc. 498 So.
2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
56. See Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 880; Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884.
57. Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883-84; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 881.
58. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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sult of the employer’s actions, the complaint alleged, an employee,
Shaun E. Fisher, died from inhaling noxious methane gas.61 Despite
these apparently atrocious facts, the court in Fisher held that, even if
true, the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint did not rise to the
level of an intentional tort.62 Thus, the court in Fisher set a high factual standard as to what constitutes “substantial” or “virtual” certainty of injury or death under Florida workers’ compensation law.
After the supreme court’s decision in Fisher, two appellate courts
issued opinions in which the courts found an intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity. Specifically, the First District Court of Appeal in Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.63 and
the Third District Court of Appeal in Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc.64
found that an employer’s conduct was substantially certain to result
in injury or death to an employee.65
In Cunningham, the plaintiffs alleged that their employer engaged in the following acts: (1) diverting a smokestack so that fumes
would flow into, rather than outside of, the plant where the employees worked; (2) periodically turning off the plant ventilation system;
(3) removing warning labels on toxic substance containers; (4) misrepresenting the toxic nature of substances; (5) knowingly refusing to
provide safety equipment; and (6) misrepresenting the need for
safety equipment and the dangers associated with working at a certain plant.66 In holding that the employer’s conduct rose to the level
of an intentional tort, the court in Cunningham distinguished its
case from the supreme court’s opinion in Fisher:
The present case differs from Fisher, wherein the complaint alleged that “in all probability” injury would result to the employee
from a one-time exposure to a dangerous gas. Here, the allegations
are that injury was “a substantial certainty” and that there was
repeated, continued exposure that was intentionally increased and
worsened by [the employer’s] deliberate and malicious conduct.67

Thus, according to the First District Court in Cunningham, “substantial or virtual certainty” appears to require “repeated” and “continued” conduct that is “deliberate and malicious” and sounding in
“fraud and deceit.”68
In Connelly, the evidence before the court suggested that the employer of the deceased plaintiffs engaged in the following conduct: (1)

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See id. at 884.
558 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
568 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
See Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 97; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
See Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id.
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intentionally misstating the weight capacity of an aircraft; (2) intentionally and repeatedly keeping its aircraft in a defective condition;
(3) concealing actual flight loads which resulted in reduced thrust
and erroneous fuel calculations; (4) ignoring reports of imminent
equipment failure; and (5) economically coercing employees to fly in
violation of Federal Aviation Association regulations.69 Eventually,
one of the employer’s airplanes crashed as a result of the conduct
listed above, and the court found that the employer had engaged in
conduct that was substantially certain to result in injury or death to
its employees.70 Much like the First District Court in Cunningham,
the Third District Court in Connelly appeared to base its finding of
“substantially certain” conduct on, inter alia, the fact that the employer in that matter routinely engaged in highly irresponsible behavior that was rooted in deceit and misrepresentation.71 In fact, the
court in Connelly specifically connected the withholding of information to the substantially certain standard:
[W]here the employer, as in this case, withholds from an employee,
knowledge of a defect or hazard which poses a grave threat of injury so that the employee is not permitted to exercise an informed
judgment whether to perform the assigned task, the employer will
be considered to have acted in a “belief that harm is substantially
certain to occur.”72

The opinions in Connelly and Cunningham were the first postLawton/Fisher cases to give factual examples of what constitutes
“substantial” or “virtual” certainty under the supreme court’s intentional tort exception. Thus, by taking the supreme court’s opinions in
Fisher and Lawton together with the district courts’ opinions in Connelly and Cunningham, “substantially certain” conduct can be defined as conduct that has “more than a strong probability of injury;”73
that is greater than “gross[ly] negligen[t];”74 that is greater than
“reckless or wanton;”75 that arises from “repeated, continued” conduct;76 or that has an element of deceit that prevents an employee
from “exercis[ing] an informed judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.”77

69. See Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449.
70. See id. at 451.
71. See id.
72. Id. (quoting Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1052 (1984)).
73. Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods, Inc., 498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
74. Id. at 881.
75. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 884 (Fla. 1986), overruled
in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
76. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
77. Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
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2. The Formative Cases
After the opinions in Lawton, Fisher, Connelly, and Cunningham,
Florida courts were left with an enigmatic and multifaceted definition of what constitutes conduct that is substantially or virtually certain to result in injury or death. Florida courts were also left with
two factual examples of what constituted an intentional tort and two
factual examples of what did not constitute intentional behavior. In
the wake of those four decisions, the district-level appellate courts in
Florida from 1991 to late 1998 consistently held that various employer conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional tort under
the “substantially certain” standard.78 Those opinions are based on
various sets of logic and reasoning. In ruling that an employer’s conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional tort via the “substantially certain” standard, some courts relied on the absence of deceitful conduct by the employer.79 Other courts relied on the strong “virtual certainty” language used by the supreme court in Lawton and
Fisher,80 while others based their decisions on somewhat novel
grounds.81
Notwithstanding the lack of uniformity in reasoning among courts
when evaluating alleged intentional behavior on the part of employ78. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 732 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), quashed, 754 So. 2d
683 (Fla. 2000); Williamson v. Water Mania, Inc., 721 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998);
Wilks v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 691 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc.
v. Phiel, 681 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), holding limited in not relevant part by Hastings v. Demming, 694 So. 2d 718 (1997); Walton Dodge Chrysler-Plymouth Jeep & Eagle,
Inc. v. H.C. Hodges Cash & Carry, Inc., 679 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), abrogated by
Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); Clark v. Gumby’s Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So.
2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), abrogated by Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000);
Subileau v. Southern Forming, Inc., 664 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Mekamy Oaks, Inc.
v. Snyder, 659 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); United Parcel Serv. v. Welsh, 659 So. 2d
1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), abrogated by Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000);
Thompson v. Coker Fuel, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), abrogated by Turner v.
PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc. v. Dipaolo, 653 So.
2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), abrogated by Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. David, 632 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Timones v.
Excel Indus.; 631 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Mirabal v. Cachurra Corp., 580 So. 2d
285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
79. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
(noting no intentional misrepresentation to employee); Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 1130 (noting that the employer did not deceive the injured employee); General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 632 So. 2d at 126 (noting the elements of deceit in Cunningham and Connelly); Timones, 631 So. 2d at 333 (same).
80. See, e.g., Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc., 653 So. 2d at 1132 (recognizing that the
virtual certainty standard is used by courts that have found intentional behavior); Mirabal, 580 So. 2d at 286 (stating that the “substantially certain” standard requires virtual
certainty of injury or death).
81. See, e.g., Williamson, 721 So. 2d at 375 (implying that some sort of employer premeditation is required under the “substantially certain” standard); Walton Dodge ChryslerPlymouth Jeep & Eagle, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 830 (implying that the “substantially certain”
standard requires affirmative acts by the employer that increase the risk of harm to the
employee).
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ers, a common theme eventually developed in workers’ compensation
immunity cases. Although court opinions dealing with workers’ compensation immunity differ as to their legal reasoning regarding the
“substantially certain” standard, almost every court dealing with the
topic turned to the opinions in Connelly, Cunningham, and Fisher for
factual examples as to what does and does not constitute an intentional tort under workers’ compensation law.82 In other words, while
Florida courts may not have been sure what “substantially certain”
means as a matter of law, many courts depended on the opinions in
Connelly, Cunningham, and Fisher to decide what constitutes an intentional tort as a matter of fact.83 By combining varying legal definitions of “substantially certain” with the factual situations set forth in
Fisher, Cunningham, and Connelly, post-1990 courts in Florida created a very high burden for employees to overcome when challenging
their employers’ workers’ compensation immunity.84
Despite the overwhelming majority of Florida court opinions that
refused to find intentional torts under the “substantially certain”
standard between 1991 and late 1998, the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued two opinions within that timeframe which found that an
employer’s alleged conduct did rise to the level of “substantial certainty.”85 In Belhomme v. Rigal Plastics, Inc.,86 the court held that a
material issue of disputed fact existed as to whether an employer’s
conduct was substantially certain to result in injury or death, due to
the fact that the employer had removed one safety device from a
plastics manufacturing machine.87 Unfortunately, the court in Belhomme did not expound on the reasoning behind its ruling, so the
opinion is of little academic value.
In Myrick v. Luhrs Corporation,88 the court found that a plaintiff ’s
complaint sufficiently alleged behavior that was substantially certain
to result in injury or death to an employee.89 Specifically, the court in
Myrick stated:
Reading Myrick’s complaint most strongly in his favor as we must
do, he alleged his employer deliberately removed or disabled five
essential safety devices designed to allow an operator to run the
saw without exposing himself to certain danger. Myrick also al82. See, e.g., Wilks, 691 So. 2d at 631; Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 681 So. 2d at 790;
Walton Dodge Chrysler-Plymouth Jeep & Eagle, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 830; Subileau, 664 So.
2d at 12; Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc., 653 So. 2d at 1131; General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 632 So. 2d at 125; Timones, 631 So. 2d at 333.
83. See cases cited supra note 78.
84. See cases cited supra note 78.
85. See Myrick v. Luhrs Corp., 689 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Belhomme v. Rigal Plastics, Inc., 625 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
86. 625 So. 2d 118.
87. See id.
88. 689 So. 2d 416.
89. See id. at 419.
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leged that he had no knowledge or warning he was being exposed
to danger by merely operating the saw. From these allegations,
one can infer some cover-up on the part of the employer.90

Referring to its opinion in Belhomme, the court in Myrick implied
that if the removal of one safety switch from a dangerous machine
raises an issue of material fact as to whether an employer’s behavior
is substantially certain to result in injury, the removal of several
safety switches accompanied by inferred deceit must state a claim in
tort that would abrogate workers’ compensation immunity.91 As
noted by Judge Emerson R. Thompson Jr. in his dissent in Myrick,
however, the court’s opinions in Belhomme and Myrick appear misplaced in light of other Fifth District opinions and opinions written
by other Florida courts.92 In fact, the Belhomme and Myrick opinions
appear to be anomalous and are admittedly “close cases” at best.93
However, the opinions in Belhomme and Myrick aptly demonstrate
the varying legal expectations and standards brought about by the
Florida Supreme Court’s ill-defined exception to employers’ workers’
compensation immunity.
IV. TURNER V. PCR, INC. AND THE CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY
AS TO WHAT “SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN” MEANS
A. Turner v. PCR, Inc.
Recently, in Turner v. PCR, Inc.,94 the following question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court:
Is an expert’s affidavit, expressing the opinion that an employer
exhibited a deliberate intent to injure or engaged in conduct substantially certain to result in injury or death to an employee, sufficient to constitute a factual dispute, thus precluding summary
judgment on the issue of workers’ compensation immunity?95

In response to the certified question, the supreme court stated
that “in order to determine whether expert affidavits preclude summary judgment, we must first decide what a claimant-employee must
show when attempting to prove the commission of an intentional tort
by an employer in order to avoid an otherwise valid workers’ compensation defense.”96 With this said, the court went on to state, “we
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing J.B. Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v. Shafer,
663 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kline v. Rubino, 652 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995);
and Timones v. Excel Indus., 631 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
93. See Myrick, 689 So. 2d at 418 (stating that “[t]his is a close case”).
94. 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000).
95. Id. at 684.
96. Id.
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recognize and reaffirm the existence of an intentional tort exception
to an employer’s immunity, and hold that the conduct of the employer must be evaluated under an objective standard.”97 In fact, the
supreme court in Turner specifically reaffirmed its creation of the intentional tort exception in Eller and its adoption of the “substantially
certain” standard in Fisher and Lawton.98 However, in an unexpected
move, the supreme court receded from its opinions in Fisher and
Lawton to the extent that those opinions suggest that “substantially
certain to cause injury or death” means “virtually certain to cause injury or death.”99 The court also receded from its factual holdings in
Fisher and Lawton to the extent that those opinions did not find behavior sufficient to constitute an intentional tort under the “substantially certain” standard.100 Thus, in two passing footnotes, the supreme court in Turner overruled every case in Florida that has relied
on the “virtual certainty” standard in Fisher and Lawton and/or
every opinion that has relied on Fisher and Lawton’s factual determinations that certain behavior does not rise to the level of “substantial certainty.” In addition to receding from Fisher and Lawton, the
court in Turner stated as follows:
Although we continue to find that “substantial certainty” requires
a showing greater than “gross negligence,” we emphasize that the
appropriate standard is “substantial certainty,” not the heightened
“virtual certainty” standard. As noted earlier, we upheld legislation in Eller that created an exception to a managerial coemployee’s immunity when the coemployee acted with culpable negligence. That culpable negligence exception is not unlike the “substantial certainty of injury” exception we recognized in Fisher and
Lawton.101

In other words, as opposed to the “virtual certainty” standard that
the supreme court wrote of in Fisher and Lawton, the present members of the supreme court now equate the “substantially certain”
standard to the supervisory/managerial culpable negligence standard
in section 440.11(1). After setting forth this new view of “substantially certain to cause injury or death,” the court in Turner went on
hold that the employer’s conduct at issue in that case raised a mate-

97. Id.
98. See id. at 687.
99. See id. at 687 n.4. The contention that this was an unexpected move from the
court is based on the fact that the “virtual certainty” language in Fisher and Lawton had
remained viable for 14 years without comment from the supreme court and the fact that
many courts relied on the “virtual certainty” language as the basis for upholding workers’
compensation immunity. See cases cited supra, note 78.
100. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
101. Id. at 687 n.4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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rial issue for a jury to decide.102 Like many Florida courts before it,
the court in Turner relied on the facts of Connelly and Cunningham
to justify its finding of “substantially certain” behavior, thereby fortifying Connelly and Cunningham’s positions as the de facto “gauges”
of intentional behavior in workers’ compensation law.103
B. The Continued Uncertainty as to What
“Substantially Certain” Means
With the supreme court’s decision in Turner, it seems that “substantially certain to cause injury or death” now means behavior: (1)
that is akin to behavior that demonstrates a reckless indifference to
the safety of injured employees (that is, culpable negligence);104 (2)
that arises from “repeated and continued” conduct;105 and (3) that has
an element of deceit that prevents an employee from “exercis[ing] an
informed judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.”106 Despite this somewhat tortured definition that can be extrapolated from
the court’s opinion in Turner, the supreme court’s recent attempt to
clarify the meaning of “substantially certain to cause injury or death”
falls short of being helpful. For example, the following questions,
among others, remain unanswered after Turner:
(1) Does behavior akin to culpable negligence, without an element
of deceit, but with repeated and continued conduct, constitute an
intentional tort?
(2) Does behavior akin to culpable negligence, with an element of
deceit, but without repeated and continued conduct, constitute an
intentional tort?
(3) Does behavior akin to culpable negligence, without an element
of deceit, and without repeated and continued conduct, constitute
an intentional tort?
(4) What exactly is behavior akin to culpable negligence?

102. See id. The court in Turner also took great pains to note that the standard by
which “substantial certainty” is evaluated is an objective standard. To justify its discussion
of this seemingly apparent fact, the court cited to two district-level opinions that arguably
required “true intent” to injure rather than objective evaluations of the circumstances. See
id. at 688. To the extent that the objectivity of the “substantial certainty” standard was
ever an actual issue, the court’s discussion of objectivity in Turner is correct. See 2 ARTHUR
LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 68.15(c) (desk ed. 1999).
103. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690. For the proposition that Connelly and Cunningham
are the de facto “gauges” of intentional behavior under Florida workers’ compensation law,
see supra Part III.B.1.
104. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688 n.4, 689 n.5.
105. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). This
reasoning from Cunningham was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at
690.
106. Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). This reasoning from Connelly was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690.
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Review of post-Turner court opinions that have addressed workers’ compensation immunity to date evidences the remaining confusion as to what constitutes an intentional tort. For example, in
Holderbaum v. ITCO Holding Co.,107 the court held that although the
behavior at issue in that case may have been “perhaps grossly or
even culpably [negligent],” the behavior was not substantially certain
to result in injury or death.108 With the supreme court’s pronouncement in Turner that “substantially certain” conduct is “not unlike”
culpable negligence,109 one must wonder whether the court in
Holderbaum was correct in drawing a distinction between culpable
negligence and “substantial certainty.” Another example of confusion
can be found in Gerth v. Wilson.110 A mere two months after the supreme court’s opinion in Turner, the Second District Court of Appeal
certified a question to the supreme court regarding the scope of
workers’ compensation immunity.111 Thus, it appears that fourteen
years after the intentional tort exception to an employer’s workers’
compensation immunity was contemplated in Fisher and Lawton,
employers and employees in Florida still have no real understanding
of what constitutes an intentional tort under the “substantially certain” standard. With this in mind, a legislatively defined exception to
an employer’s workers’ compensation immunity appears to be in order.
V. A CALL TO THE LEGISLATURE FOR A STATUTORILY DEFINED
INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION
As argued above, courts in Florida do not have a workable definition of what constitutes an intentional tort under workers’ compensation law. Given this fact, employers and employees in Florida cannot
reasonably depend on the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation
remedy, and this uncertainty goes against the legislative intent of
the workers’ compensation statute.112 Also as argued above, the
courts in Florida have varied in their application of the intentional
tort exception to employer immunity, and this lack of consistency

107. 753 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), cert. denied, 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2269 (Fla. Nov.
7, 2000).
108. Id. at 700.
109. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687 n.4.
110. 774 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
111. See id. at 7. The certified question in Gerth asks the supreme court whether an
OSHA violation abrogates workers’ compensation immunity if the violation in question
subjects the employer to a term of imprisonment exceeding 60 days. See id.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000) (stating that the policy behind workers’ compensation law is to “assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to
an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to gainful employment at a reasonable cost to the employer”).
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goes against the very nature of the judicial system.113 With these
problems in mind, a logical solution appears to be a statutorily defined exception for intentional torts committed by employers.
A. The Percentage Definition
With the need for a legislatively defined exception to workers’
compensation employer immunity argued, the remaining question is
how a statutory exception should be defined.114 Although many intentional tort exceptions are possible, this Article advances what can be
called a “percentage definition” of intentional tort behavior. To appreciate such a definition, one must first explore the nature of behavior that is classified as intentional.
As noted by the Florida Supreme Court in Spivey, “the distinction
between intent and negligence boils down to a matter of degree.”115 At
the high end of the culpability spectrum is behavior that is intentionally designed to harm another.116 For the purposes of this argument, actual intent to injure is classified with a 100% culpability rating. At the low end of culpability is behavior that unintentionally
causes injury due to carelessness or negligence.117 Assume that simple negligence can be classified with a 20% culpability rating. Somewhere on the scale between actual intent to injure and negligence
lies unintentional behavior that is so culpable that “[actual] intent
[to injure] is legally implied and [the behavior] becomes assault
rather than unintentional negligence.”118
With the aforementioned assumptions made, one can classify implied intentional behavior as conduct that does not reach the 100%
level of actual intent, but comes so close to it that the law will assume that the conduct was intentional. How much culpability is appropriate before imputing intentional conduct? Surely if actual intent
is 100%, then implied intent should be at least 90%. This sort of “percentage rating” exercise forms the foundation of this Article’s proposed definition of an intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation employer immunity.
If one were to take the percentage rating system used above and
apply it to the “substantially certain to cause injury or death” stan113. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1349 (6th Cir. 1992)
(stating that our judicial system is “founded on the premise that justice and consistency
are related ideas”); supra Parts III and IV.
114. This comment presupposes that an intentional tort exception to an employer’s
workers’ compensation immunity is desirable. Although an argument can be made that intentional torts should fall within the purview of workers’ compensation immunity, such
normative arguments are beyond the scope of this Article.
115. Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
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dard used by Florida courts in evaluating workers’ compensation
immunity, one could arrive at a percentage figure that better explains what constitutes an excluded intentional tort. For example,
the phrase “substantially certain to occur” might be fairly defined as
an event that has at least a 75% chance of occurring.119 Thus, the
phrase “substantially certain to result in injury or death” can be read
as “75% certain to cause injury or death.”
The problem with this definition of substantial certainty is that a
75% chance of injury does not square with the assumed 90% level of
culpability used to define implied intentional behavior above. In
other words, if one views implied intentional behavior as behavior
that is almost as culpable as actual intentional behavior (90% culpability out of 100%), then it does not logically follow that a 75% chance
of injury can be equated with an implied intent to injure an employee. What this also suggests is that “substantial certainty” simply
does not rise to a level of implied intent.
The phrase “virtually certain to occur,” however, can be fairly defined as an event that has at least a 90% chance of occurring.120 If one
reads “substantially certain to cause injury or death” as “virtually
certain to cause injury or death,” then the 90% chance of an employee
being injured or killed squares with the 90% culpability rating given
to implied intentional behavior. Stated another way, if one views implied intentional behavior as behavior that is almost as culpable as
actual intentional behavior (90% culpability out of 100%), then it
logically follows that a 90% chance of injury can be equated with an
implied intent to injure an employee.121 In fact, this equality between
virtual certainty and implied intent could explain the supreme
court’s earlier use of the term “virtual certainty” in further defining

119. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (equating a substantial risk of death with a 75% percent chance of death); Eagle v. North Dakota Workers’
Compensation Bureau, 583 N.W.2d 97, 102 (N.D. 1998) (referencing a statute that finds
substantial gainful employment as 75%); Davis v. O’Hara, No. 92-3314-I, 2000 WL 336749,
at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (referencing a regulation that finds substantial compliance as
75% compliance); Taylor v. Shigaki, 930 P.2d 340, 344 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (finding substantial performance of a contract when an opening settlement offer comprised 75% of insurance policy limits).
120. See, e.g., Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 1989)
(stating that a 90% protection rate of immunization eliminated virtually any potential
harm).
121. The author is aware that a quantified culpability percentage and a percentage
chance of injury are not necessarily co-equal. For example, an employer with an actual intent to injure has a 100% culpability rating even if the employer attempts to injure an employee in a manner that has a very low percentage chance of actually causing injury. In
such a case, an employer with actual intent could be held criminally responsible for attempting to injure an employee, even if the employee was not actually injured. In the
realm of implied intent and workers’ compensation immunity, however, implied intent is
primarily driven by the degree of risk associated with an employer’s conduct, thus making
the degree of risk and culpability interrelated.
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the phrase “substantially certain to cause injury or death” in Fisher
and Lawton.122
With the fundamental precepts of a “percentage definition” of implied intentional behavior defined, a proposed intentional tort exception to employer workers’ compensation immunity can be offered.
Further, the 90% culpability rating seems most appropriate for defining implied intentional behavior; in turn, 90% seems more aptly described as “virtually certain.” Thus, the following intentional tort exception should be used in section 440.11, Florida Statutes:
Pursuant to this section, employers are provided with immunity
from suit by their employees so long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in or that is virtually certain to result in serious injury or death to the employee. An
act is considered to be virtually certain to result in serious injury
or death to an employee when that act will result in serious injury
or death 90% of the times that the act is done.123

With this proposed definition stated, however, some additional
questions arise. As noted in Part IV.B., the current Turner definition
of “substantially certain to cause injury or death” is behavior that: (1)
is akin to behavior that demonstrates a reckless indifference to the
safety of injured employees (that is, culpable negligence);124 (2) arises
from “repeated and continued” conduct;125 and (3) has an element of
deceit that prevents an employee from “exercis[ing] an informed
judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.”126 Although the
proposed “percentage definition” detailed above vitiates subsection
(1) of the Turner definition, the elements of deceit and continued
conduct in subsections (2) and (3) must be addressed.
122. See Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986),
overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co.,
498 So. 2d 882, 884 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
123. This proposed definition may raise concerns with some readers due to the fact
that an actual percentage is used to quantify the term “virtual certainty.” Specifically,
some might argue that using a percentage will invite a “war of experts” in which plaintiffs’
experts proffer that conduct was 90% certain to cause injury while defense experts claim
that the relevant conduct was below 90%. While such concerns may or may not be wellfounded, the author asserts that a numeric quantification would serve as a stable guidepost that courts could use to determine substantial and/or virtual certainty, rather than
the current system of “I know it when I see it.” Under the current court-created intentional
tort exception, one judge may view “substantially certain” conduct as conduct that is more
likely than not to result in injury (51%) while another judge may view such conduct as
imminent and sure to occur (99%). With the proposed percentage exception, the two hypothetical judges above could issue consistent rulings by relying on a legislative definition
within section 440.11.
124. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 688 n.4, 689 n.5 (Fla. 2000).
125. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). This
reasoning from Cunningham was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at
690.
126. See Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). This reasoning from Connelly was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690.
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1. Repeated and Continued Conduct
As discussed above, the court in Connelly suggested that “substantially certain” conduct must be coupled with an element of repeated and continued actions on the part of an employer.127 Under
the statutory intentional tort exception proposed in this Article, continued and repeated conduct by the employer might or might not factor into a court’s determination of whether certain behavior was
virtually certain to result in injury or death. For instance, an
employer may repeatedly ask its employees to work in conditions
that have a 50% chance of resulting in injury or death. But under the
proposed provision, no matter how many times an employer asks its
employees to work in such conditions, the employer’s conduct would
never rise to the level of virtual certainty; a 50% chance of risk will
not equal a 90% chance of risk no matter how many times an
employee is exposed to that risk. On the other hand, if an employer
engages in repeated and continued conduct that acts to increase an
employee’s risk of injury each time the employer acts, such repeated
and continued conduct could eventually result in virtual certainty.
An example of such behavior would be where an employer asks an
employee to fly an airplane that is low on oil. The risk of flying the
aircraft with low oil may initially be a 60% chance of injury or death,
but each time the employer has the employee fly, the risk increases
by 5%. As the increased risk of injury to the employee draws closer to
the 90% virtual certainty mark, the employer’s repeated and
continued conduct moves closer to being an intentional tort.
Therefore, rather than being an independent element of an implied
intentional tort, repeated and continued behavior on the part of an
employer is merely a factor in determining the risk of harm to an
employee under the proposed statutory definition.
2. Elements of Deceit
The third apparent element of the Turner definition of “substantially certain” is that an employer’s conduct must have an element of
deceit that prevents an employee from “exercis[ing] an informed
judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.”128 In the statutory
exception proposed in this Article, however, deceit or misrepresentation by an employer is merely a factor to be considered in determining virtual certainty, much like the issue of repeated and continued
behavior discussed above. For example, suppose that an employer
asks an employee to engage in activity that has a 75% chance of in-

127. See Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
128. Id.; see also Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690; cases cited supra note 78.
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jury or death. This act alone would not meet the 90% virtual certainty standard.
If, however, the employer conceals the risks associated with the
activity so that the employee cannot exercise informed judgment as
to how to safely perform the task or whether to perform the assigned
task at all, then the risk of injury to the employee may, but may not
be enhanced to the virtual certainty standard. A good example would
be where an employer asks an employee to mix certain volatile
chemicals together and lies to the employee by telling her that the
mixture will not be toxic. Although mixing the chemicals while wearing protective equipment has, say, a 50% chance of causing injury or
death, the employer’s lie by causing the employee to forgo the use of
protective gear, might raise the risk of injury or death to as much as
95%. In this scenario, the employer would be liable for an intentional
tort due to the fact that his or her misrepresentation caused the risk
of injury to increase to 95%. In other words, concealment, misrepresentation, or deceit may raise the risk of injury associated with a
given task from below 90% to 90% or greater. Therefore, deceitful
employer behavior can easily be factored into a court’s “virtual certainty” evaluation.129
B. The Percentage Definition Applied to Past Florida Cases
With a proposed intentional tort exception set forth, a question
remains as to how a percentage definition of intentional behavior
would work in real life. By taking factual scenarios from past workers’ compensation immunity cases in Florida and applying the exception proposed herein, one can see how a proposed percentage definition would work in practice.
1. Virtual Certainty Without Deceit or Repeated Conduct
As noted above, the “virtual certainty” standard proposed in this
Article would require a 90% chance of serious injury or death to defeat an employer’s workers’ compensation immunity. With a slight
modification, the facts found in Fisher present an excellent example
of what would constitute virtual certainty without any acts of deceit
or repeated and continuous conduct. Recall that in Fisher, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant-employer required its employees to enter pipes that contained poisonous gases in order to

129. It is important to note that under the exception proposed in this Article, deceitful
conduct in and of itself does not lead to an intentional tort. In some cases, an employer
may tell numerous lies and make numerous misrepresentations, but the risk of injury to
an employee may still remain very low. This author asserts that this distinction is an important one, but it is not clear under Florida’s current intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity.
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clean the pipes with high-pressure hoses.130 The plaintiff further alleged that the employer failed to provide its employees with oxygen
masks, gas detection equipment, rescue equipment, and other safety
equipment required under federal law.131 Assume, however, that the
poisonous gas in Fisher was cyanide as opposed to methane gas. Assume further that the employees in Fisher knew that the pipes contained toxic gases, and that their employer had forced the employees
to clean the pipes “just this once” under the threat of termination. In
such a case, any reasonable judge would find that the employer in
the modified Fisher scenario had subjected its employees to a virtual
certainty of injury or death. First, as a matter of mere common sense,
most reasonable laymen would likely believe that subjecting an unprotected human to cyanide gas fumes in a close-quartered environment would result in injury or death at least 90 out of 100 times.132
Secondly, a plaintiff in the aforementioned scenario could use expert
testimony to prove that of 100 persons subjected to concentrated cyanide gas, 90 would die.133 Although the application of the 90% standard in this example requires the use of some subjective “gut feelings,” a percentage definition provides a stable guidepost that can be
used to focus intuitive evaluations made by judges and juries.134
2. Virtual Certainty via Continued and Repeated Behavior
In Connelly, the evidence before the court suggested that the employer of the deceased plaintiffs engaged in the following acts: (1) intentionally misstating the weight capacity of an aircraft; (2) intentionally and repeatedly keeping its aircraft in a defective condition;
(3) concealing actual flight loads which resulted in reduced thrust
and erroneous fuel calculations; (4) ignoring reports of imminent
equipment failure; and (5) economically coercing employees to fly in
violation of Federal Aviation Association regulations.135 To illustrate

130. See Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8.
131. See id.
132. Admittedly, the author has no evidence to support this proposition. However, the
assertion made here seems to be pure common sense, just as one might reasonably assume
that at least 90 persons out of 100 jumping off of the Empire State Building would die.
133. The use of expert testimony to help prove implied intentional torts is not a novel
proposition in Florida workers’ compensation law. In fact, the plaintiffs in Turner used expert testimony to help establish their case. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684
(Fla. 2000).
134. A good analogue is the use of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in civil
cases. Simply asking a jury to find whether a case has been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence invites the same problematic subjectivity that has plagued the “substantially
certain” standard used by Florida courts in deciding workers’ compensation immunity
questions. However, if the same jury is instructed that a preponderance of the evidence is
more than 50%, the chance of varying decisions is minimized.
135. Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
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how the proposed standard might be applied to these facts, first assume that each time the employer forced its employees to fly in an
aircraft, the chance of injury or death to the employees was 65%. In
such a scenario, the employer’s behavior would not rise to the level of
virtual certainty and thus would never constitute an intentional tort.
While the employer’s repeated behavior might constitute culpable
negligence (meaning a “reckless indifference” to the employees’
safety),136 it would not constitute implied intent to injure the employees under the virtual certainty standard.137
However, assume that the Connelly employer’s failure to address
continued reports of imminent equipment failure on its airplanes increased the risk associated with each flight by 5%. Each time that
the crew was forced to fly the defective aircraft, the employer’s conduct would move closer to being an intentional tort. When and if the
airplane in question finally crashed, a judge or jury could look at the
totality of the employer’s behavior to determine whether the risk of
the final flight had risen to 90% or greater. Obviously, expert testimony could be used to substantiate the per flight increase of risk that
would be added to the base risk of flying a defective aircraft.
3. Virtual Certainty via Deceit
In some workplace situations, employees may be forced to work
with dangerous chemicals or substances. The risk of working with
such substances may be high, but the use of precaution and proper
protective gear may lower that risk to acceptable levels. In Cunningham, as discussed above, the employer removed warning labels on
toxic substances, misrepresented the toxic nature of substances to its
employees, knowingly provided inadequate safety equipment to its
employees, and misrepresented the level of toxic substances present
in its plant.138 Assume for the sake of argument that the risk of injury from working with the toxic substances in Cunningham was
25% if protective gear were used and proper precautions were taken.
Further assume that the risk of injury without protective gear and
precautions was 95%. By misrepresenting the need for safety equipment and precautions to its employees, the employer in this scenario
would have prevented the employees from reducing their 95% exposure to serious injury down to 25%, and it would thus be liable in
tort.

136. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 689 n.5 (Fla. 2000).
137. One must keep in mind that indifference to injury and an intent to injure are two
different things. Although being indifferent to whether an employee is injured is reprehensible, it is not, by definition, the same as actual or implied intent to injure.
138. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
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4. No Virtual Certainty
In Mekamy Oaks, Inc. v. Snyder,139 an employee, Leon Snyder,
used a riding lawn mower in the normal course of his employment as
a groundskeeper.140 At some point, the lawn mower in question began
losing power, and Snyder’s supervisor told him that a malfunctioning
safety switch on the mower was causing the power loss.141 After determining the origin of the power loss, Snyder’s supervisor told him
that he was going to remove the safety switch to solve the problem.142
Snyder remarked to his supervisor that someone could be injured by
operating the mower without the safety switch but continued to use
the mower for several days after the switch was removed without incident.143 Some time after the switch was removed, however, Snyder
operated the mower on a sloped surface and the mower reared up
and ejected Snyder causing the mower blade to cut his foot.144 Snyder
contended that the safety switch that had been removed would have
prevented his injuries.145
In the factual scenario above, it can be argued that there was not
a 90% chance of serious injury or death to Snyder and thus no intentional tort under workers’ compensation law.146 Put in simple terms,
the average person’s experience with riding lawnmowers is that they
rarely rear up and eject the rider at an angle which causes the rider’s
foot to be exposed to the blade that is housed on the underside of the
mower. In Mekamy Oaks, Snyder’s accident appears to have been a
fluke in that the injury was predicated on the following combination
of facts: (1) he drove the subject lawnmower on a sloped surface
which caused the mower to rear up; (2) the rearing action caused him
to be ejected; (3) the rearing action exposed the mower blade at an
angle that crossed Snyder’s trajectory as he fell from the mower; and
(4) Snyder’s exposure to the blade was sufficient to cause serious injury.147 In such a case, an expert could be used to testify as to the

139. 659 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
140. Id. at 1291.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Again, the author has no hard evidence to support this position but instead relies
on a reasonable “gut feeling” based on the proposed virtual certainty standard. Although
relying on “gut feelings” is not an ideal method of administering justice, the court in
Mekamy Oaks appeared to do just that, considering that the opinion gives no commentary
to support its holding that Snyder’s employer did not commit an intentional tort. See id.
With the proposed percentage definition of virtual certainty, the court in Mekamy Oaks
could have expressed its intuitive decision in quantifiable percentage-of-risk terms, rather
than simply finding—without comment—that the behavior in question did not rise to the
level of an intentional tort.
147. See id.
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unlikelihood of all four of these events coming together and the cumulative risk of serious injury if they did.
As seen from the four examples above, the application of the percentage definition offered in this Article yields logical results that are
consistent with the policies behind Florida’s workers’ compensation
law. When applied to “real life” workers’ compensation immunity
cases, the proposed virtual certainty definition minimizes the need
for unbridled subjective court decisions and provides a stable evidentiary standard that can be developed with expert testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Florida, workers’ compensation law plays an important social
role due to the fact that it “assure[s] the quick and efficient delivery
of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and facilitate[s] the worker’s return to gainful employment at a reasonable
cost to the employer.”148 For the provision of workers’ compensation
benefits to be effective, employers and employees alike must renounce some of their common law rights and defenses under the law
and look to workers’ compensation as the exclusive remedy for qualifying workplace injuries.149
With this fact in mind, the exclusivity provisions found in Florida’s workers’ compensation statutes must be applied consistently
and with equal force to both employers and employees. Under the
current court-created intentional tort exception to an employer’s immunity, employers and employees in Florida have no reasonable certainty as to the scope of the workers’ compensation remedy. This uncertainty degrades the policies behind workers’ compensation law.
Instead of relying on the ill-defined and subjective intentional tort
exception created by the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida Legislature should enact an intentional tort exception that can be applied in
a fair and consistent manner. Adopting a standard that requires a
probability of 90% to show “virtual certainty to cause serious injury
or death,” the legislature could provide clear, objective guidance as to
what sort of behavior constitutes an implied intentional tort that
would abrogate an employer’s workers’ compensation immunity.
With such a statutorily defined exception in place, courts in Florida
could evaluate the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy
in a fair and consistent manner that furthers the policies that lie at
the heart of workers’ compensation law.

148. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000).
149. See id.

